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Cross-Border Issues in Collective Management 
Adriana Moscoso* 
Good morning, everybody. 
I was an LLM student here a few years ago, so I am very happy to be back here 
today.  I want to thank Professor Ginsburg for giving me this opportunity and I also 
want to thank the team from the Kernochan Center for its support.  They have 
invited me to come and talk about cross-border licensing issues in Europe.  I do not 
know how familiar everyone is with all of the things that have been going on in the 
last ten years in Europe concerning this issue.  So, I am going to go through the 
steps that we have undertaken.  At the end, I would like to share with you my ideas 
about what the future of collective management for online works should be, in 
Europe and worldwide. 
First, in order to see how the system of collective management of rights has 
evolved, I would like to quickly look back at how it used to work in the offline 
world.  You probably know that through the umbrella organizations called CISAC 
and BIEM (CISAC for performing rights and BIEM for mechanical rights) 
collective societies worked through what we called “reciprocal representation 
agreements” (“RRAs”).  This meant that society A signed an RRA with society B, 
and through this RRA society A represented the repertoire of society B in the 
territory of society A.  These RRAs were signed by almost all the societies in the 
world, creating a net of agreements that allowed society A to represent almost all of 
the world’s repertoire in its own national territory.  With the arrival of the Internet, 
licenses could no longer be nationally given, and thus the collective management 
organizations under CISAC decided in 2000 to adapt the reciprocal representation 
agreements to the online world through signing the Santiago Agreements for 
performing rights and the Barcelona Agreements for mechanical rights. 
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What did these new agreements establish?  They established: 1) that the 
territorial scope of the license was no longer national, but rather was worldwide; 2) 
that the licensed repertoire would be the repertoire of all the societies signing these 
agreements (at the beginning there were six or seven societies that started signing 
the agreements, but soon there was almost a worldwide representation of societies); 
and 3) that the licensor would be the society of the licensee’s economic residence.  
Societies also included in the new agreements a most favored nation clause, 
according to which, if any society extended better conditions to another society, 
these better conditions would be extended to the rest of the societies signing the 
Santiago and Barcelona agreements. 
European societies communicated the Santiago and Barcelona agreements to the 
European Commission (“EC”) for validation, but the EC considered these 
agreements against article 81 of the European Union treaty, which fights 
restrictions of markets and barriers for the creation of a single European market.  
The agreements gave absolute national exclusivity to existing national societies, 
reinforced the already natural monopolies that these societies had in their countries 
and eliminated competition between collective societies through the most favored 
nation clause.1  According to the EC, the agreements were preventing the market 
from evolving and from creating alternative offers, thus restricting the trade 
between member states.  As a consequence of the EC reply, E.U. collecting 
societies terminated the Santiago and Barcelona agreements and went back to the 
“offline world.” 
But the EC considered it necessary to take further action in order to change the 
situation and to develop an easier licensing system for users.  The first action 
undertaken by the EC in this respect was the May 18, 2005 Recommendation on 
Collective Cross-Border Management of Copyrights and Related Rights for 
Legitimate Online Music Services.2  The recommendation stated that rights holders 
in the E.U. could join any collective society they wished to, irrespective of their 
national economic residence or that of the society; that rights holders could select 
the territorial scope of the mandate given to the collective management and 
determine the online rights to be entrusted to the societies; and that rights holders 
could also transfer multiterritorial management of rights to another society, 
different than the one that had been his or her society until then.3 
The next step undertaken by the EC was the 2005 Impact Assessment 
Reforming Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyrights and Related Rights 
for Legitimate Online Music Services, in which the Commission analyzed the pros 
and cons of different options to be applied in the online music market and the role 
that the EC should play in any of these options.4  There were three options.  Option 
 
 1. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 81, 
Sep. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 8889 (now TFEU art. 101). 
 2. Commission Recommendation 2005/737, on Collectice Cross-Border Management of 
Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services, 2005 O.J. (L 276) 54 (EC). 
 3. Id. at 56. 
 4. Commission Staff Working Document:  Impact Assessment Reforming Cross-Border 
Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services, SEC 
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one: do nothing and see how the market would evolve by itself.  Option two 
proposed to eliminate restrictions and customer location provisions in the 
reciprocal representation agreements, creating a system like the “Santiago” system 
but without the national territorial restriction and the economic residence 
restriction.  Finally, option three proposed giving rights holders the ability to 
appoint the collective rights manager that they wished for the online use of their 
musical works.  Option three, as we will see, was the one chosen by many rights 
holders in Europe. 
The final step undertaken by the EC was the CISAC decision, which held that 
the traditional reciprocal representation agreements signed by the CISAC societies 
were anticompetitive.  The origins of this decision was a complaint issued by a TV 
broadcaster against GEMA, the German collective management society, as a 
consequence of GEMA’s refusal to grant to the TV broadcaster a pan-European 
license instead of a national territory license covering the German territory, 
according to the reciprocal representation agreement system in place.5  The EC 
believed that CISAC reciprocal representation agreements restricted competition 
since they limited the ability of collective rights managers to offer their services 
outside of their domestic territories. 
So, what have been the consequences of these actions undertaken by the EC?  
Many multinational publishers withdrew their online rights from collective 
management organizations and created new licensing bodies for their own 
repertoires.  Also, the E.U. collective management societies have renegotiated their 
reciprocal representation agreements and have eliminated the membership, 
exclusivity and territoriality clauses. 
Now, compared with the situation before, all of the authors’ rights are no longer 
evidently available from collective management societies.  That means that a user 
in Europe needs to knock on many different doors now in order to be sure that he or 
she has all the necessary licenses that will allow him or her to start a music 
business.  And collective societies compete with each other for repertoires. 
This is a map of the European Union licensing situation right now.  A licensee 
today—for example, an entrepreneur who wants to start a music business in 
Europe—must knock on too many doors.  If he wants to have the Anglo-American 
repertoire—which is, of course, the most attractive for music businesses—he will 
have to request licenses from CELAS for the EMI Anglo-American repertoire; 
from PAECOL for the Sony Anglo-American repertoire; from DEAL for the 
Universal repertoire; and from several European collecting societies under the Pan-
European Digital Licensing (“PEDL”) initiative for the Warner Anglo-American 
repertoire.6  Also, if he wants the Latin repertoire, he must call SGAE to obtain 
 
(2005) 1254 (Oct. 11, 2005). 
 5. Summary of Commission Decision of 16 July 2008 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 81 
of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, 2008 O.J. (C 323) 12. 
 6. See Licensing Online and Mobile Use, CELAS, http://www.celas.eu/CelasTabs/ 
Licensing.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2011) (“CELAS . . . is responsible for licensing the rights of EMI 
Music Publishing throughout Europe when those rights are used in an online or mobile service.”); 
PEDL, WARNER/CHAPPELL MUSIC, http://www.warnerchappell.com/pedl/pedl.jsp (last visited Feb. 23, 
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rights to the Sony Latin repertoire, the Peermusic Latin repertoire, SGAE’s own 
repertoire, the repertoire from SPA (Portugal) and the repertoires from many of the 
Latin-American societies.7 
With all these licenses, he will have approximately seventy percent of the pie.  
But he will still have to contact the remaining European societies to obtain licenses 
for other local repertoires:  the Greek repertoire, the Italian repertoire and so on. 
In sum, the licensee must obtain around thirty different licenses if he wants to be 
sure that he will not receive claims from any local collective rights society. 
What are the consequences of this situation?  It is true that we do not have a 
fragmented territory anymore, but rather now we have fragmented repertoires.  And 
a fragmented repertoire effectively creates a fragmented territory again because 
users have to knock on many doors across Europe.  This licensing scheme is not 
easy for users:  they incur high transaction costs and much legal uncertainty, which 
creates barriers to entry for small businesses.  A big music business, such as 
iTunes, can hire lawyers and work across different countries to obtain all of the 
necessary licenses to start its business, but it is difficult for a small business that 
also wants to compete on the Internet.  “Long tail theory businesses” cannot 
succeed in such a landscape.8 
The process of clearing rights is also much more complicated for collective 
rights societies and raises concerns about the survival of Europe´s cultural 
diversity.  Small repertoires are not appealing to big businesses; a licensee may 
renounce, for example, the Greek repertoire in order to develop its online music 
business, since it may be worth the trade-off in losing those consumers that would 
be interested in that repertoire. 
The current situation also enables the growth of piracy in Europe and erects 
barriers to entry for legal businesses in Europe.  While digital music represents 
about forty-five percent of the overall U.S. music market, it represents only around 
fifteen percent of the overall European music market.9  The 2011 Digital Music 
 
2011) (“PEDL is Warner/Chappell Music's Pan European Digital Licensing initiative that offers digital 
and mobile service providers the opportunity of licensing Warner/Chappell Anglo US copyrights on a 
pan European basis from a single point in Europe, should they want to.”); Press Release:  European 
Music Rights Organisations Announce Commitment to DDEX Messaging Standards, DIGITAL DATA 
EXCHANGE (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.ddex.net/press_releases/10-01-22.htm (“PAECOL GmbH 
attends to the Pan-European licensing of the Anglo-American mechanical repertoire of SONY/ATV 
Music Publishing in the field of online and mobile services.”); Universal Music Publishing Group and 
SACEM Announce Name of Pan-European Licensing Model, as well as a Variety of Pan-European 
Deals with Major Internet Companies, SACEM, http://www.sacem.fr/cms/site/en/home/about-
sacem/documentation/2009-press-releases/universal-music-publishing-group-and-sacem-announce-
name-of-pan-european-licensing-model-as-well-as-a-variety-of-pan-european-deals-with-major-internet-
companies (last visited Feb. 23, 2011) (“Universal Music Publishing Group . . . and [SACEM] today 
announced that they have named their joint model for the licensing and administration of their rights for 
multiterritorial online and mobile exploitation in Europe.  The licensing model will be named ‘D.E.A.L.’ 
(Direct European Administration and Licensing).”). 
 7. See SOCIEDAD GENERAL DE AUTORES Y EDITORES (SGAE), http://www.sgae.es (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2011). 
 8. See generally CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL (2006). 
 9. IFPI, IFPI DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2010:  MUSIC AT THE TOUCH OF A BUTTON (2010), 
available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2010.pdf; IFPI, http://www.ifpi.org (last visited 
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Report of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
(“IFPI”) indicates that one out of four Internet users in the European Union visits 
unlicensed sites each month.10  For example, Spain has become a real champion in 
digital piracy, and such piracy is harming the music sector and musical diversity in 
Europe.  There have been no new artists among Spain’s top sales since 2008, and 
there have been no Spanish artists in the European Union’s top sales since 2007.11  
This is a new situation; previously, there were new Spanish artists coming up every 
year. 
So, what can we do in order to improve this situation?  The European 
Community probably did not contemplate these consequences when it undertook 
various reforms, but it is important to address them. 
In response to licensing difficulties, stake holders have proposed the creation of 
HUBS, which are aggregations of certain repertoires by some collective rights 
societies.  Armonia, for example, is a project that allies SGAE (Spain), SACEM 
(France) and SIAE (Italy) in order to aggregate the repertoires of these three 
societies.12  The International Copyright Enterprise (“ICE”) is a similar joint 
venture undertaken by PRS (United Kingdom) with STIM (Sweden).13  CISAC has 
also been working for the last year on the creation of a pan-European licensing 
portal.  Finally, the European Broadcaster’s Union (“EBU”) has raised a proposal 
similar to the Satellite-Directive model and to the Santiago Agreement model. 
The most important initiative on the part of regulators is the project of a 
collective management directive from the European Commission’s Directorate-
General for Internal Market and Services (“DG MARKT”).  There are not yet many 
publicly available details about this directive, but we do know that DG MARKT 
hopes to launch this project in early 2011.  Some of the main issues raised will be 
transparency in collective management of rights and simplification of the licensing 
system created in the last two years. 
In my opinion, the HUBS model will be more favorably received by the 
European Commission than a pan-European portal model.  A pan-European portal 
would unify all European Union licenses into a one-stop shop, whereas the HUBS 
system would offer several “points” of licensing (similar to the system in the 
United States, where three collective rights management societies grant licenses). 
Clearly, the options are completely open right now, and collective rights 
management societies are working very hard with the European Commission and 
 
Mar. 28, 2011). 
 10. IFPI, IFPI DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2011:  MUSIC AT THE TOUCH OF A BUTTON 14 (2011), 
available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2011.pdf. 
 11. Id. at 15.  The Report provides: 
Until 2004, at least one Spanish act would sell more than one million album copies across 
Europe every year.  In 2007 one act, Alex Ubago, reached that mark, but no other Spanish act 
has reached it since then.  In each of the past two years, not a single new Spanish artist has 
featured in the country’s top 50 selling albums compared with ten in 2003. 
Id. 
 12. ARMONIA, http://www.armoniaonline.com/home.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
 13. What is ICE?, PRS FOR MUSIC, http://www.prsformusic.com/creators/helpcentre/Pages/ 
WhatisICE.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
MOSCOSO Final 12/5/2011  8:25 PM 
656 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:4 
with other stake holders to create a better situation than the current one. 
Thank you. 
 
